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Utilitarian and nonutilitarian valuation of natural resources: A game-theoretical approach 
         
Jac. A.A. Swart* and Jorien Zevenberg* 
 
Abstract 
Ecological services such as food, fresh water, fuel, minerals, and flood control – to name only a few – 
are essential conditions for human well-being. Many of the areas that provide such services  – 
wetlands, coastal areas, and deserts – are common pool resources, which are characterized by non-
excludability and subtractability. That makes them vulnerable to collective action problems such as 
the prisoner’s dilemma, where individual and collective interests collide and ultimately result in 
overexploitation and degradation. Damaged areas that provide ecological services are increasingly 
recognized as targets for ecological restoration. However, restored areas run the risk of back-sliding to 
the previous state if their common pool characteristics are ignored. Collective action problems are 
often analyzed from a game-theoretical perspective that usually assumes rational, self-interested 
individuals, who do not take collective and nonutilitarian perspectives into account. However, people 
do not value natural resources just for utilitarian reasons but also because of ethical nonutilitarian 
ones. This paper develops a multiple-actor game-theoretical approach to one’s “value achievement” by 
taking into account both utilitarian and nonutilitarian perspectives. It demonstrates that someone’s 
value achievement is contingent on choices made by others and that considering nonutilitarian 
perspectives may avoid the prisoner’s dilemma. Accordingly, this model is empirically confirmed by a 
survey among life-sciences and biology students by presenting them a hypothetical case of a restored 
natural area. Based on these results, it is argued that emphasizing nonutilitarian considerations may be 
an important additional strategy in conservation and restoration projects. 
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• Restoration projects that aim to restore common pool resources should take into account the 
vulnerability of these areas and the related societal circumstances. 
• An exclusive focus on ecosystem services and utilitarian gains in restoration ecology 
underestimates the role of nonutilitarian motives. 
• A lower utilitarian profit may nevertheless lead to a higher value achievement if one 
recognizes the nonutilitarian value of nature. 
• Involvement of local people in restoration and conservation projects should be accompanied 
by communicative, discursive, and reflective activities concerning the value of natural 
resources in order to mobilize nonutilitarian valuation motives.  
 
Introduction 
It is increasingly recognized that ecological services are a critical condition for future human well-
being on a global scale. Well-functioning ecosystems provide mankind with essential goods and 
services such as food, fresh water, fuel, and minerals, for example. They are essential for climate and 
water system regulation, nutrient cycling, soil formation, flood control, primary production, carbon 
storage, etc. Moreover, ecosystems provide us with cultural services such as spiritual, religious and 
aesthetic values, along with opportunities for recreational and educational use (MEA 2005). In this 
context ecological restoration is increasingly recognized as a global priority due to the globally 
disruptive effects of desertification, land degradation, and climate warming on ecosystem services – to 
name just a few – which have such consequences for the well-being of humanity (e.g., Aronson et al. 
2007; Aronson and Alexander 2013). Moreover, international policy bodies recognize the role of 
ecosystem services. Articles 14 and 15 of the Aichi targets, formulated at the 2010 Conference of the 
Parties (COP) and reaffirmed by later COP meetings of the Convention of Biological Diversity 
(CBD), for example, acknowledge the importance of ecological services and the role of ecological 
restoration (CBD 2010; 2012; 2014).  
 Recently, Alexander and colleagues (2016) stressed the relevance of ecosystem services for 
restoration: “The desirability of different ecosystem services dictates the form of restoration or 
rehabilitation to be undertaken.” The concept of ecosystem services is related to the concept of natural 
capital: the stocks of natural resources that facilitate the continuous and sustainable flow of services to 
societies (Aronson et al. 2007). Many ecosystems, such as wetlands, forests, natural grasslands, and 
the oceans with their fish populations, are examples of natural capital, because they deliver important 
ecosystem services to humanity. Many of these examples of natural capital – although not all – are 
especially vulnerable, because they must be considered as common pool resources, characterized by 
non-excludability and subtractability (Ostrom 2010). Non-excludability implies that it is very difficult 
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to exclude people from utilizing the resource. For example, it is very difficult to restrict herders from 
letting their flocks grazing on open access rangelands. Subtractability means that utilization reduces 
the availability of the resource for others; thus grazing by one decreases the grazing opportunities for 
other herders. 
As a consequence, decisions that are profitable for individual users of a common pool resource 
may, all things being equal, be disastrous for the group of users as a whole because of the cumulative 
detrimental effects from all users of the resource. This so-called “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 
1968) is a collective action problem where individuals reap the benefits of the resource at the cost of 
the common good of all. This may result in overexploitation and degradation of natural resources, for 
instance, in terms of collapsed fish populations, fresh water pollution, desertification, erosion, and 
biodiversity loss (Feeny et al. 1990; Garrity 2012; Hardin 1998). Hardin (1968) believed that private 
ownership of natural resources and top-down, state-led measures were needed to prevent such 
disasters. However, Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated that community-based approaches, where local 
communities have the opportunity to set their own rules in order to prevent overexploitation, may also 
work (Ostrom 1990; 2010). 
The recognition that overexploitation and degradation of natural resources may be causally 
related to common pool characteristics implies that ecological restoration should take into account the 
related societal issues. If a degraded natural area has been successfully restored, it is important that the 
causal human and social conditions be mitigated to avoid a backsliding of the area to the previous 
state, later on. Ecological restoration may thus imply social-ecological system approaches (Gosnell & 
Kelly 2010; Petursdottir et al. 2013). Collective action problems are often analyzed by means of game-
theoretical analyses. In conservation biology and ecological restoration, we also find these approaches 
(Buckley & Holl 2013; Busby & Albers 2010; Colyvan et al. 2011; Frank & Sarkar 2010). However 
these approaches focus on costs and profits, and conflicts between stakeholders (environmental 
managers, land owners, governments, farmers, etc.), thus stressing the affected utilitarian, 
anthropocentric interests of stakeholders. 
In this paper, we will be taking another approach, because people do not consider nature from 
such anthropocentric and utilitarian perspectives alone. Many people believe that nature and natural 
landscapes should also be preserved or restored for non-anthropocentric and nonutilitarian reasons, for 
example, because of their intrinsic value, as a civic duty, or because of the rights of future human and 
non-human generations (Dietz et al. 2003; Dobson 1998; Paavola 2003/2004; Gelissen 2007). In our 
“value game” approach, we use the terms utilitarian and nonutilitarian values to distinguish between 
these two main environmental-ethics positions. First, we will sketch a multi-actor game-theoretical 
model for the valuation of natural resources and illustrate the model by a numerical example. Next, we 
will report on a survey experiment among biology and life-sciences students to test the model. Finally, 
we will discuss our results and the implications for environmental communication and policymaking 
strategies in restoration and conservation projects.  
4		
Theory 
Conflicting interests in environmental issues 
are often illustrated by the well-known 
prisoner’s dilemma metaphor, a scenario in 
which two actors act according to their self-
interests, which then prevents a better outcome 
for them both. For example, suppose that two 
fishermen are both free to choose between 
moderate fishing and maximizing fishing in a 
pond given the payoffs from the four 
combinations (see Case A in Figure 1). The 
best-shared solution is that both choose for 
moderate fishing. However, it is tempting for 
one actor to maximize his or her fishing 
efforts if the other actor chooses for moderate 
fishing, because he will then reap a much 
higher profit. Because this is also the case for 
the other fisherman, both may reap a payoff of 
only 5 units, in this example, whereas 10 units 
for both could have been possible (Figure 1, 
Case A). This suboptimal result is called a 
Nash equilibrium, meaning that an actor has 
nothing to gain by changing his or her 
strategy, given the maximizing strategy by the 
other. 
However, people do not just behave 
out of selfish considerations. Acheson and 
Gardner (2011), for example, describe how 
lobster fishers in the state of Maine (USA) 
were able to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma trap 
by establishing a socially shared rule not to 
take egg-bearing lobsters. Lejano and De 
Castro (2014) argue that compassion for others and social norms also determine one’s actions and that 
altruistic considerations can be incorporated in a utility function: U = f (p1, p2, … pn), where U is the 
utility, f is a functional expression, and (p1, p2, … pn ) is a vector of payoffs of the actors involved. 




Figure 1.  Game-theoretical representation of possible 
payoffs of two actors (e.g. fishermen), who can 
choose between moderate and maximized use (e.g., 
fishing) (Cases A and B are taken from Lejano & De 
Castro [2014]). The numbers between parentheses in 
Case A are hypothesized payoffs units for Actors I 
and II, respectively. In Cases B and C, the numbers 
between parentheses are derived utilities based on the 
payoffs in Case A, according to Ui=piαpjβ. In all cases, 
the underscored and bold payoffs are stable 
configurations (Nash equilibria), implying that actors 
cannot turn individually to another strategy without 
losing payoffs, given the maximizing strategy by the 
other. In Case A, both actors only take their own 
payoffs into account, which leads to a prisoner’s 
dilemma. In Cases B and C, both actors also take the 
payoff for the other into account (see text). This 
avoids the prisoner’s dilemma. However, in Case C, 
there are two stable equilibriums, implying that, 
although moderate use is profitable for both, when 
both start with maximum utilization, they cannot turn 
individually to moderate use without losing payoffs. 			
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where Ui is the actor i’s utility, k is a constant, pi and pj are the payoffs for actor i and j, respectively, 
and α and β are coefficients representing, respectively, the strength of selfish and altruistic attitudes of 
actor i. Lejano and De Castro (2014) demonstrate that Equation 1 with k=1, and α=0.4, and β=0.6 
results in an escape from the prisoner’s dilemma (see Case B in Figure 1). In Case C in Figure 1, with 
α=0.8 and β=0.2 we get a so-called assurance game outcome (Dixit et al. 2015), which is 
characterized by two equilibriums: one with the optimal result, the other with the suboptimal result as 
in Case A. Of course, whether or not the prisoner’s dilemma will indeed be avoided also depends on 
the nature of the preference function Ui.  
 
Valuation achievements of the use of common pool resources  
In our approach, we will elaborate on the approach by Lejano and De Castro (2014) by applying a 
similar reasoning to the utilization of common pool resources, in which utilitarian and nonutilitarian 
motives are involved. Suppose that an actor takes pu units (e.g., fish, timber, etc.) from a common pool 
resource. Because this common pool resource is a subtractable resource, (pmax-pu ) units remain in the 
resource pool, where pmax is the total available size of the resource. We also assume that an actor may 
be willing to limit his profit for nonutilitarian reasons. Those reasons may be: for other people, for 
eco-centric reasons, for future generations, etc. In this context both pu and (pmax-pu) contribute to one’s 
utility, albeit for different reasons, i.e. because of utilitarian and a nonutilitarian considerations, 
respectively. Figure 2 shows the construction of this model. We prefer to use the term “value 
achievement” (V) instead of “utility” (U), because the latter term sounds inappropriate for the 
nonutilitarian value considerations used in our approach. Analogous to the approach by Lejano and De 
Castro (2014), we assume that the total value achievement can be described by a Cobb-Douglas 
function.  
 
V=kpuα(pmax-pu)β          Eq. 2 
 
where k is a constant, and α and β are coefficients representing the strength of utilitarian and 
nonutilitarian motives, respectively. Lejano and De Castro (2014) sum up α and β to 1. However, in  
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Figure 2.  Schematic model of the value achievement approach. The lower scheme is a mathematical 
representation of the upper scheme (see text in the section Theory). 
 
 
our model we consider nonutilitarian 
motives as being additional motives, 
since we see no reason why utilitarian 
motives would reduce the strength of 
competing nonutilitarian motives. In 
general, assuming a diminishing 
marginal utility for both α and β this 
implies that 0≤α,β<1. Equation 2 
results in a hill-shaped curve with a 
maximum value of V (by taking 
dV/dpu=0) at:	pu=pmax α/(α+β), see 
Figure 3 with two arbitrary examples. 
Thus the maximum value achievement 
is gained by a moderate payoff, if 




Most environmental problems are not a two-actor prisoner’s dilemma but involve many actors. A 
multiple-actor situation can be described by plotting an actor’s payoff against the number of all the 
moderate actors involved (Dixit et al. 2015). A moderate user is someone who refrains from any 
possible maximal utilization for nonutilitarian reasons. As an example, in Figure 4A we see two 
payoff plots expressing the utilization of natural resources by maximizing users and moderate users, as 
a function of the number of moderate users (n). The function pmod(n) expresses moderate payoffs, the 
		
Figure 3. Two examples of value achievements based on a 
combination of utilitarian and nonutilitarian valuation of a 
payoff from a hypothetical resource according to Equation 
2 (see text) in which k = 1; pmax = 12. Solid line: α = 0.7, β 
= 0.3; Dashed line: α = 0.4, β = 0.7. The value of pu with 
the maximal value of V can be derived by calculating 
dV/dpu=0 which results in 	pu=pmax α/(α+β). The maximal 
value of V of the solid line is at pu=8.4 and of the dashed 
line at pu= 4.36.  
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function pmax(n) expresses payoffs of the remaining (N-n), maximizing users. For every payoff 
according to pmod(n), there is a corresponding higher payoff according to pmax(n). Both functions show 
increasing payoffs (from left to right along the x-axis) with an increase in the number of moderate 
users because of the less negative effects on the resource through decreasing numbers of maximizing 
users. Thus pmax is not a constant anymore as in Equation 2 but a variable that depends on the number 
of moderate actors (n). 
Now, suppose that all actors are moderate users (n=N) and aim to reap payoffs from the 
resource at level P, because it is expected that it will guarantee a sustainable and durable yield for all. 
Similar to the case of the two actors, a single actor may decide to maximize his or her use because of 
the tempting higher payoff, according to pmax(n). As a consequence, the payoffs for all the other actors 
are reduced somewhat. Furthermore, the number of moderate actors will decrease and the number of 
maximizing actors will increase, each with one actor (see inset in Figure 4A). As long as pmax(n-
1)>pmod(n), it is attractive for everyone to make the change to maximizing use, thus to choose profits 
at the level of line R-S. If all actors behave according to this reasoning, they all will end up at position 
S, whereas the better position P would be possible. Thus, as in the two-actor prisoner’s dilemma, the 
multiple-actor prisoner’s dilemma leads to a non-optimal result. 
 However, let us assume that moderate users do not change to line R-S because of additional, 
nonutilitarian considerations, which also contribute to their value achievement (see Figure 2). The 
more moderate users there are, the less the negative effects will result through the remaining 
maximizing users. This may result in a higher value achievement for the moderate users because of the 
resulting higher ecological quality of the natural resource. In case of strong nonutilitarian attitudes it 
may be perhaps, even higher than the value achievement of maximizing users that only consists of 
their utilitarian payoff. This situation is illustrated by line P’-Q which crosses line R-S at a point n=Nc. 
The point n=Nc functions as a tipping point for value achievement. Assuming that the actors aim for 
maximizing their value achievement will move moderate users above n=Nc to point P'; however, 
below n=Nc, it will move them to point S. The point n=Nc functions as a tipping point for value 
achievement. 
Thus the inclusion of nonutilitarian considerations with respect to natural resources may lead 
to achieving a higher value. However, one’s value achievement and the accompanying rational choice 
will also be contingent on the behavior of other people. To test this hypothesis we performed a 
numerical simulation and an empirical test. 
 
Simulation of a multiple-actor value game 
Based on Equation 2, we define two value achievement functions in a multiple-user situation: Vmax and 
Vmod as functions of maximizing and moderate payoffs, respectively, and the number of moderate users 
(n). To do so, we replaced the term pu in Equation 2 by pmax in Vmax and by pmod in Vmod. Moreover, it is 
assumed for simplicity’s sake that the constant k in Equation 2 is equal to 1 and that the nonutilitarian 
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coefficient is β=0 in the case of the maximizing (purely utilitarian) actors. Finally, we must use pmax(n-
1) in the function Vmod instead of pmax(n) because of the reduction of the number of complying actors 
(n), if an actor switches to maximizing use (see inset Figure 4A). This results in: 
 
Vmax(n)=[pmax(n)]α         Eq. 3 
and 
Vmod(n)=[pmod(n)]α [pmax(n-1)- pmod(n)]β       Eq. 4 
   
Now, suppose we have 100 actors 
using a common pool resource 
(e.g., an open-access grazing 
area), and that moderate users and 
maximizing users reap payoffs as 
given in Case A in Figure 1A. 
Thus, if all actors limit their use in 
order to maintain a moderate and 
therefore sustainable use of the 
resources, their payoff is 10 units 
at n=N=100. However, if users 
switch to maximizing use, 
moderate payoffs will decrease 
through degradation of the 
resources. At n=0 the payoff is 
only 2 units. Also, the payoffs of 
maximizing users will decrease, 
but they are higher over the whole 
range than those of moderate 
users: 12 units at n=N=100 and 5 units at n=0. For simplicity’s sake, we assume a linear relationship 
(comparable to Figure 4A) for both payoffs functions and the number of moderate users:  
 
pmax(n)=0.07n+5         Eq. 5 
and  
pmod(n)=0.08n+2         Eq. 6 
 
where pmax and pmod are the payoffs of maximizing and moderate users, respectively, and n is the 
number of moderate actors. Substituting pmax and pmod in Equations 3 and 4 for Equations  5 and 6, 
respectively, results in corresponding value achievement functions: 
		
Figure 4. Box A: Multiple-actor prisoner’s dilemma. Box B: Multi-actor 
value achievements model, in which nonutilitarian values are considered 
in the model. Legends are Solid line: maximizing users; Dashed lines: 
moderate users; n: number of moderate actors; N: total number of actors 
involved; Nc: critical number of moderate users above the value 
achievement for moderate use is higher than maximizing use (see text in 
the section Theory for further explanation).  	
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Vmax(n)=[0.07n+5]α         Eq. 7 
and  
Vmod(n)=[0.08n+2]α [2.93-0.01n]β       Eq. 8 
 
In Figure 5, we have plotted some 
examples of Equations 7 and 8 with 
α=0.8 in all cases. The solid line in 
Figure 5 represents the value 
achievement of maximizing users 
(Equation 7), and the Dashed lines the 
value achievements of moderate users 
(Equation 8) for different values of β. 
This figure demonstrates that, in 
contrast to Figure 4B, value 
achievements need not to be 
represented by straight lines, even if 
the payoff functions are given by 
simple linear functions. The plots of 
Equations 7 and 8 cross each other in 
case of β=0.4 somewhere at n=32. 
Thus in case of β=0.4 the value 
achievement of a moderate actor appears to be higher than that of a maximizing actor, if the number of 
moderate actors is higher than 32. Below that point, nonutilitarian valuation does not sufficiently 
compensate for the reduced utilitarian valuation. For β=0.6, nonutilitarian value compensation 
happens for nearly all values of the number of moderate users (n). However, if β=0.2, such 
compensation does not occur at all. Thus, the numerical simulation supports the idea that at higher 
values of the nonutilitarian coefficient β, one’s value achievement through moderate use may in a 
sense compensate for utility loss, but that it is also contingent on the number of actors that follow a 
moderate strategy. 
 
An empirical test 
Suppose we have a successfully restored natural area, where rare bird species now breed. In order to 
protect the area, the nature conservation organization involved has asked the local population if they 
are willing to use a new and alternative footpath through the area during the breeding season (March 1 
to June 30), instead of the already existing footpath that goes right through the most vulnerable part of 
the area. The new footpath is, however, less attractive than the old footpath. 
	
 
Figure 5. Examples of value achievement based on Equations 7 
and 8 with α=0.8 for all cases. Legends are Solid line: Value 
achievement maximizing users (Vmax) based on Equation 7; 
Dashed lines: Value achievements moderate users (Vmod) based 
on Equation 8;β: nonutilitarian coefficient in Equation 8 (see 
text for further explanation). 
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 From a purely utilitarian point of view, compliance to the request will lead to a lower 
utilitarian payoff (that is: less pleasure) because of the lower level of natural beauty of that area. 
However, we hypothesize that, in spite of a lower utilitarian payoff, compliance with the request by 
the natural protection organization may nevertheless result in a higher value achievement as compared 
to non-compliance because of nonutilitarian motives. To test this hypothesis, we assessed value 
achievements that resemble the points of P’, Q, R, and S in Figure 5 by means of a questionnaire given 
to second-year biology and life sciences students at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 
during a course that was supervised by the authors of this paper.  
 
Methods 
In our questionnaire, based on an approach by Chua (2003), we asked the respondents to evaluate four 
situations with respect to the request by the nature conservation organization not to use the footpath 
through the vulnerable area during the breeding season, as described above (see also Appendix A1).  
• A1: Assume that EVERYONE (including yourself) follows the request to use only the new 
footpath outside the vulnerable part of the natural area during the breeding season.  
• A2: Assume that ONLY YOU will make use of the new footpath. Thus nearly everyone will 
still make use of the path through the vulnerable part of the natural area during the breeding 
season. 
• A3: Assume that ONLY YOU will make use of the path through the vulnerable part of the 
natural area during the breeding season. Nearly everyone else uses the new footpath. 
• A4: Assume that EVERYONE (including yourself) still makes use of the path through the 
vulnerable part of the natural area during the breeding season. 
 
Thus A1 and A2 refer to compliance; A3 and A4 refer to non-compliance with the request by the 
nature conservation organization. The four situations, A1, A2, A3, and A4, respectively, represent the 
points P’, Q, R, and S in Figure 4B. The survey ended with a question about how great the chance was 
that the respondent would comply with such a request in reality. The reason for this last question was 
to distinguish between subgroups with possibly different distributions of utilitarian and nonutilitarian 
motives. In addition to these questions, we also asked for information on age, sex, study specialization 
or major, and year of arrival at our university to get an idea of the researched population. 
For each situation (A1, A2, A3, and A4), the respondents were asked how much they agreed 
with the four items expressing the valuation statement of the described situation, using a 5-point Likert 
scale (see Appendix A1). For all four situations, the same set of value items was used. So the 
differences related to the situations described. The mean value scores of the items with regard to the 
A1, A2, A3, and A4 situations represent, respectively, the respondent’s value achievement of 
complying when 1) all others also comply (n=N), 2) he or she is the only one who complies (n=1), 3) 
the respondent is the only one who does not comply (n=N-1), and 4) nobody complies (n=0). 
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Our first hypothesis is that the resulting value achievements are an increasing function of the 
number of complying respondents, thus that of A1>A2 and A3>A4. Our second hypothesis is that 
somebody’s value achievement through compliance differs from non-compliance behavior, thus A1≠
A3 and or A2≠A4 (ignoring the differences between n=N and n=N-1, and n=1 and n=0, 
respectively). 
 Prior to the survey, the questionnaire was tested with smaller student groups from third- and 
fourth-year courses and the clarity of the described situations and value statements was accordingly 
discussed with them. The survey was taken on the first day of the second-year course in Science, 
Ethics, Technology, and Society in 2016. Participation in the survey was voluntary, and the survey 
was anonymous. Course assistants put the data from the survey into an Excel sheet and double-
checked them for errors. Subsequently, the data were transported to an IBM SPPS statistics 23 data 
file for statistical analysis.  
Based on the outcomes of the last question as to their behavior in a real case, we divided the 
students into a high scoring group (HS group) of people that scored 50% or higher and a low scoring 
group (LS group) of people that scored below 50%. We calculated Cronbach’s alpha in order to 
determine the reliability of the respondent’s answers on items related to the situations A1, A2, A3, and 
A4. Assuming an ordinal nature for the Likert-scale data, we applied a Related Samples Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test to compare the values of A1, A2, A3, and A4, according to the hypothesized 
relationships described above for all respondents, male and female groups, and the HS and LS groups.  
 
Results 
In the analysis, we only included questionnaires in which the four situations (A1, A2, A3, and A4) and 
the last question on compliance in a real case were completed. This resulted in 164 (84%) useable 
surveys. The majority of the 
respondents were female (55.5%) The 
mean age was 20.2 years (range: 18-
29 years; S.E.M.=0.14). About half of 
our respondents were majoring in 
biomedical sciences. Our sample 
represents a typical second-year 
student population in life sciences and 
biology studies in the Netherlands. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the 
respondents.  
In general, the calculated Cronbach’s 
alphas (see Table 2) indicate sufficient 
Table 1. Overview of the respondents in the survey. 
Total students invited 196 
Total respondents 170 
Total valid questionnaires  164 
Mean age (16 respondents missing) 20.2 years 
Women 91 
Men 73 
Specializations or majors (1 respondent missing)  
   General Biology 4 
   Molecular Life Sciences 17 
   Behavior- and Neurosciences 27 
   Ecology and Evolution 34 
   Biomedical Sciences and related majors 81 
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reliability of the responses to the four sets of statements for each situation. Only the reliability of A1 in 
the HS group and female responders were just below the level of 0.70 that is usually recommended. 
All other reliabilities were above that level. Accepting the reliability of the responses, it appears from 
our analysis that our first hypothesis, implying that value achievement is an increasing function of the 
number of complying respondents (Hypothesis I), was confirmed for both the compliance (A1>A2) 
and non-compliance strategy (A3>A4), although the difference in the latter case is rather small. It 
appears that A1>A3, meaning that, if everybody complies (thus n=N), the expected value achievement 
turns out to be maximum. If nobody complies (n=0), there is no significant difference between the 
mean A2 and A4 values in the all-respondents groups, the male and female groups, and the HS groups. 
However, the LS group shows a value for A2 that is a significantly lower value than A4 at n=0. Thus 
the value achievement of compliance for the number of complying respondents close to n=0 is lower 
than that of non-complying respondents (see Table 2 and Figure 6, in which we have plotted the value 
achievements by the LS and HS groups). 
 
Table 2. Statistics of the survey on value scores by respondents in four situations (A1, A2, A3, and A4) (see 
Appendix A1). The HS and LS groups refer to respondents who indicated that they estimated the chance >50%, 
respectively < 50% that they would comply with the request by the nature protection organization in reality. The 
p-values were generated by the SPSS Related Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.		 	 All  Male Female HS  LS Subgroup	size	 	 164 73 91 131 33 Cronbach’s		α	 A1	 0.74 0.77 0.69 0.65 0.81 A2	 0.78 0.81 0.76 0.80 0.74 A3	 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.86 A4	 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.83 Mean	(SE)	 A1	 4.33  (0.04) 4.25  (0.07) 4.04  (0.54) 4.43  (0.04) 3.95  (0.13) A2	 1.99  (0.07) 2.02  (0.11) 1.98  (0.08) 2.01  (0.08) 1.90  (0.13) A3	 2.47  (0.08) 2.56  (0.12) 2.40  (0.10) 2.36  (0.08) 2.95  (0.18) A4	 2.12  (0.07) 2.21  (0.11) 2.04  (0.09) 2.02  (0.08) 2.51  (0.15) 
p	 A1>A2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A3>A4 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.019 
A1≠A3  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A2≠A4 0.149* 0.138* 0.547* 0.785* 0.006 
*: Not significant p ≥0.05. 
 
Although we have drawn straight lines between A1 and A2 and between A3 and A4 in Figure 6, we 
may not assume a linear relationship, since we do not know the actual functions of these lines. Thus 
we cannot determine where the lines of the LS group in Figure 6B cross each other. But we may 
conclude that if the numbers of complying respondents in the LS group is small, thus close to n=0, 
13		
compliance will lead to a lower value achievement; in contrast, if the numbers of complying 
respondents is close to n=N, compliance results in a higher value achievement than non-compliance. 
The differences for A1, A3, and A4 between the LS and HS group are, respectively, 0.48, 0.59, 0.48 
on the 5-point Likert scale, with significant levels p<0.05 (Mann-Whitney U test). The difference 
between the A2 values is -0.11 units and not significant. Thus, the crossing of the two lines in Figure 
6B seems likely to be the result of an upward shift in the value achievement of the non-compliance 
strategy (A3-A4 line) by the LS group, as compared to the HS group over the full range of the number 
of complying respondents, indicating a stronger utilitarian attitude. We also analyzed the different 
major groups (see Table 1). However this did not result in sharp differences with the all-respondents 
group in Table 2 (data not shown).  
In conclusion, considering compliance to be an expression of a nonutilitarian attitude, the 
analysis of the survey confirms the value achievement model and is in line with the simulation. 
Moreover, the survey question about compliance in a real situation demonstrates that respondents may 
differ with respect to their nonutilitarian attitudes. 
We administered our survey to young biology students but cannot help wondering what the 
outcomes would have been with a broader group of people. We hypothesize a similar distribution of 
utilitarian and nonutilitarian attitudes with regard to ecological restoration across gender, age, and 
social variables (Gobster et al. 2016). Our survey assessed attitudes towards a hypothesized restoration 
project and indicated the willingness of people to adapt their behavior for utilitarian and nonutilitarian 
reasons. We believe that such an empirical approach might also be useful in advance of the 
implementation of real restoration projects, to collect information on people’s attitudes regarding the 
proposed projects. This might give restoration managers a chance to adjust their projects so as to gain 
greater public support.  
 
General discussion 
The results of the survey confirm the idea that limitation of the use of resources may contribute to 
someone’s total value achievements and that this behavior is contingent on behavior of others. Thus, 
value games, in which value is attributed to the act of not using natural resources, may lead to 
different outcomes compared to classic, purely utilitarian payoff games. This is in line with Lejano 
and De Castro (2014), who focused on altruistic behavior towards other users. We applied their 
approach in the context of the utilitarian and nonutilitarian valuation of natural resources and extended 
their analysis to a multiple-actor case where nonutilitarian valuation of natural resources implies a 
positive value towards non-use that may compensate for the reduced utilitarian-value achievement.  
However, the fewer moderate users there are, the smaller the nonutilitarian value achieved 
because of the detrimental effect on the natural resource. This might even result in a sort of tipping 
point, below which nonutilitarian considerations would be overridden by utilitarian considerations, as 
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demonstrated in Figure 4 and confirmed by the numerical simulations and the LS group in the survey 
experiment. 
 In general, nonutilitarian orientations all have one thing in common, which is that one refrains 
from full utilization of natural resources for the benefit of “the other,” whoever or whatever “the 
other” is. Thus the coefficient β in Equation 2 may refer to different and/or multiple types of 
nonutilitarian considerations. People 
may restrict their use of the commons 
or of natural resources for different 
nonutilitarian reasons. In many 
Western societies this might primarily 
be due to ecocentric considerations 
(Swart et al. 2001) or to a recognition 
of the rights of wild animals (Swart & 
Keulartz 2011), but in more traditional 
societies it might instead be related to 
spiritual or religious considerations 
(Houde 2007).  
It might be argued that all 
these nonutilitarian motives contribute 
to the satisfaction of one’s own key 
values and that they should be 
considered as utilitarian motives after 
all. However, this reasoning ignores 
the debate on utilitarian and 
nonutilitarian environmental ethics. 
Because of our more ethical 
perspective, we introduced the term 
“value achievement” instead of the 
term “utility” to distinguish between 
these ethical orientations.  
 Of course, the result of our 
analysis depends on the type of value 
achievement function chosen. In this analysis, we applied the Cobb-Douglas function. An alternative 
might be, for example, a max-min function (Lejano & De Castro 2014). However, the Cobb-Douglas 
function applied here is interesting, since it implies an environmental axiology, where the utilitarian 
and nonutilitarian values are intrinsically related, and where utilitarian values may even be considered 
as constitutive for nonutilitarian values (e.g., intrinsic value) (Korsegaard 1983; Kagan 1998). Our 
	
	
Figure 6. Box A. Graphic representation of the value 
achievements of the high-scoring responders (HS group) on the 
question if they would comply the request in a real case. Box 
B: low-scoring group (LS- group). Legends are Solid lines: 
Value achievement of compliance behavior; Dashed lines: 
Value achievement of non-compliance behavior; A1, A2, A3, 
A4: Likert-scale values of situations presented (see also 
Appendix S1). 		
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approach may therefore be seen as a response to the criticism that the concept of ecological services 
reduces restoration and conservation to a purely utilitarian enterprise (Swart et al. 2001; McCauley 
2006; Turnhout et al. 2013; Schröter et al. 2014). It stresses a stewardship perspective that recognizes 
the multiple layers of meaning in our natural landscapes (Hourdequin & Havlick 2016). Welchman 
(2012, p. 303), for example, defines environmental stewardship as “responsible management of human 
activity affecting the natural environment to ensure the conservation and preservation of natural 
resources and values for the sake of future generations of human and other life on the planet.” The 
value of linkages between social and ecological objectives is recognized in many restoration projects 
(Egan et al. 2013) and in nature conservation initiatives, such as Integrated Conservation and 
Development Programs (ICDP), Community Conservation Plans (CCP) (see, e.g., Brown 2002; 
Salafsky & Wollenberg 2000; Berkes 2007), and Payment for Environmental Services (Engel et al. 
2008), to cite some examples. 
 Our analysis demonstrates that nonutilitarian attitudes may lead to higher value achievements 
as compared to purely utilitarian attitudes. This conclusion is, of course, only true for actors who 
indeed recognize nonutilitarian perspectives. A purely utilitarian actor is, so to speak, impervious to 
the additional value that restricted use may offer him or her. The difference between the HS and LS 
groups illustrates that people may differ in this respect. However, moving from maximizing towards 
moderate utilization is not simply an issue of value maximization but rather a matter of changing one’s 
perspective vis-à-vis nature. Communication, discussion, and reflection are therefore important. 
Decision traditions and strategies, in which multiple visions of nature are respectfully discussed and 
shared, may contribute to a change in people’s mindsets and thereby to a wider social acceptance of 
conservation and restoration projects in which local people participate or which depend on the support 
of lay people. 
 As explained in the introduction, many ecosystem services stem from common pool resources, 
which are vulnerable to over-exploitation because of their non-excludability and subtractability 
features. Restoration projects that aim to restore open accessible and subtractable resources, including 
many wetlands, rangeland, and marine and coastal areas, should take these features into account. Our 
analysis demonstrates the game-theoretical characteristics of public support for such projects not only 
with respect to utilitarian considerations but also to nonutilitarian considerations. In addition, our 
survey makes clear that these considerations can be measured and proactively used for presenting and 
adjusting restoration projects in accordance with the perceptions, preferences, and attitudes of local 
people (see also Van Marwijk et al. 2012; Buijs et al. 2011). In addition to measures to regulate access 
and utilization of such areas (e.g., zoning, fishing limits, income compensation, payment for 
environmental services, permit regulations, etc.), strategies that may enhance, mobilize, or respond to 
nonutilitarian valuation are important, especially when top-down organized access and restrictive 
utilization measures are not feasible, or feasible only to a limited extent. Pro-active communication, 
discussion, and reflection are therefore important: they may contribute to a change in people’s 
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APPENDIX S1: Casus and survey questions 
 
Imagine, a natural area in the direct surroundings of your home. You use it regularly for walking, for 
example with your dog, or for running. 
 
In this natural area rare and vulnerable communities of different animal and plant species can be 
found. The area is especially vulnerable for human disturbance during the breeding season. Already a 
single visitor can have a negative impact on the breeding success of some species.  
 
According to some ecologists there is a need to minimalize the recreation pressure during the breeding 
season (from March 31 until July 1). It will contribute to the biodiversity and the protection of 
threatened species. The nature conservation organization decides after consultation with the 
municipality and the neighbor organization to construct new footpaths in order to avoid the use of the 
footpath through the vulnerable part of the natural area. 
 
The users of the natural area are asked to make use of the new walking paths instead of the old 
footpath through the vulnerable part of the area especially during the breeding season. However, your 
favorite route with the dog or your running route goes through the vulnerable part of the area. The new 
footpaths are qua natural beauty less attractive. 
 
Please, read thoroughly the case above and answer subsequently the list of questions. It will take in 
total about 10 minutes. The answering of the question list is completely anonymous. Many thanks in 
advance for your cooperation. 
 
The question list below consists of two parts: (1) a short, general part, and (2) four hypothetical 


















Part 2: Four situations with regard to the casus  
 



















A1 Assume that EVERYONE (including yourself) follows the request to use only the new 
footpath outside the vulnerable part of the natural area during the breeding season.  In 
that case: 
 I think it is fine  □ □ □ □ □ 
 Will this situation deliver me enough □ □ □ □ □ 
 I think it is an acceptable situation  □ □ □ □ □ 
 The situation will contribute to my interests  □ □ □ □ □ 
A2 Assume that ONLY YOU will make use of the new footpath. Thus nearly everyone still 
make use of the path through the vulnerable part of the natural area during the 
breeding season. In that case: 
 I think it is fine  □ □ □ □ □ 
 Will this situation deliver me enough □ □ □ □ □ 
 I think it is an acceptable situation  □ □ □ □ □ 
 The situation will contribute to my interests  □ □ □ □ □ 
A3 Assume that ONLY YOU will make use of the path through the vulnerable part of the 
natural area during the breeding season. Nearly everyone else uses the new footpath. In 
that case: 
 I think it is fine  □ □ □ □ □ 
 Will this situation deliver me enough □ □ □ □ □ 
 I think it is an acceptable situation  □ □ □ □ □ 
 The situation will contribute to my interests  □ □ □ □ □ 
A4 Assume that EVERYONE (including yourself) still makes use of the path through the 
vulnerable part of the natural area during the breeding season. In that case: 
 I think it is fine  □ □ □ □ □ 
 Will this situation deliver me enough □ □ □ □ □ 
 I think it is an acceptable situation  □ □ □ □ □ 
 The situation will contribute to my interests  □ □ □ □ □ 
 
  0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 
How big do you estimate the chance that in 
reality you will make use of the new paths 
outside the vulnerable part of the natural area 
during the breeding season? 
□ □ □ □ 
Many thanks for filling in the survey 
